Abstract Knowing what is at stake in terms of likely damages from accumulating greenhouse gases, how can major emitters fail to reach agreement on limits? Bargaining analysis suggests that an uneven distribution of abatement costs over time may play a significant part. Using a stylized, complete-information model of the strategic space facing the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States, a simple numerical example reaches a strong and surprising conclusion: To be feasible under current technological and economic conditions, any international agreement on climate change will have to allocate a level of future emissions for carbon dioxide in China that is at least twice as large as the level for the United States, in order to account for the effects on Chinese interests from continued economic growth.
would place an upper bound on emissions and begin a process of imposing a downward trajectory on global emissions that would be evident by 2050 (Christoff 2010: 648) . Conversely, the negotiating position of the United States reflected above all the administration's need to be domestically perceived as being in active defence of the US' economic interests, especially in the midst of a prolonged recession. 1 In sum, it appears that China and the United States ''had a determinant influence on the creation of an Accord that appears to suit their separate needs despite, or because of, its weaknesses'' (Christoff 2010: 644) . The result was yet another failure to limit greenhouse gases produced by the world's two largest emitters, comprised now of the United States and China. 2 This article presents a theory to explain how such a convergence of avoidance strategies occurred despite acknowledgement by all sides that a problem exists. The starting point for this theory is to recognize the importance of ongoing changes in energy use and emissions paths in shaping the content of international negotiations on climate change. 3 These changing paths create uncertainty for states about the potential gains and exposures to risk that could result from regulation by a comprehensive international regime. Under such conditions, negotiating outcomes are dominated by practical concerns in the United States and China over the distribution of abatement and opportunity costs relating to foregone fossil fuel-driven growth, as well as over the capacity of their economies to maintain growth and competitiveness-either with or without negotiated constraints on energy policy. 4 To understand the effects of changing expectations about future emissions, the present article applies bargaining theory, a powerful analytical tool for understanding political negotiations as an incremental process-over the long run, instead of as a series of discontinuous events alternating between cooperation and discord. Remarkably, formal models of bargaining developed within the international relations tradition have rarely been applied to international environmental negotiations, or the issue of climate change and the international effort to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases specifically. 5 In the economics literature, a number of approaches employing a bargaining framework have 1 For evidence of the pivotal importance of economic recession in determining public attitudes about the seriousness of the climate change problem, see Shum (2012) . 2 Together, in 2008, the United States and China produced 60.5 % of the world's coal, and 43.5 % of global carbon dioxide emissions (British Petroleum Company 2009; International Energy Agency 2009) . See also Zhang (2011) , Walsh et al. (2011 ), Massetti (2011 . 3 See, e.g., Paterson (2009: 152) . 4 As in most economic analyses of climate policy, we intend to incorporate such concerns directly, in a measure of the marginal cost of emissions reduction, that is, ''the costs that the economy undertakes to reduce a unit of greenhouse gas emissions (or the equivalent in other policies that would slow greenhouse warming)'' (Nordhaus 1993: 18) . 5 There have been few game-theoretic analyses in the applicable issue area that extend beyond the usual Prisoners' Dilemma analogies or enumerations of coalitional participation possibilities, despite the striking results yielded from exceptions like Ward's (1993) and Pittel and Rübbelke's (2012) efforts to incorporate chicken game frameworks into analyses of the climate change problem, or Ward et al.'s (2001) veto player analysis, which tended to predict that a successful cooperative outcome would be more difficult than commonly believed. Barrett (2003) also provides numerous useful examples centered on settings where it may be difficult to find any self-enforcing agreements (in contrast to the classical bargaining problem of reconciling alternative preferences among multiple available agreements). Fearon (1998) applies a dynamic ''war-of-attrition'' stopping game framework to international cooperation generally, and the insights derived from this work apply equally to international environmental cooperation (see also note 28 below). Stone (2009) also draws interesting insights from modeling ''long-term policy,'' but takes a different approach by using a median-voter tax-policy framework to analyze negotiating relationships within the subset of democratic states. been applied to the climate change problem. Chen (1997) uses a two-player bargaining approach, as does the present article; Chen, however, focuses on the nature of side payments in a potential climate change agreement, rather than on the substantive quantitative concessions that are required to reach an agreement. Similarly, Pinto and Harrison (2003) develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze bargaining in a multiplayer context of multilateral bargaining within a multidimensional issue space and accordingly concentrate their attention on the generalized give-and-take that can occur across different issues among different groupings of actors.
6 Caparrós et al. (2004) also develop a sequential game in a multilateral framework and explicitly attempt to model negotiations between developed and developing countries, while adding the feature of asymmetric information in order to find separating and pooling equilibria for actors with varying informational characteristics, in terms of general functional forms. Finally, Okada (2007) presents a multilateral bargaining model with random proposers and focused on reduction commitments with emissions trading, with the result that bargaining power increases with the probability of being a proposer in such a model.
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This article intends to fill a gap in the literature by applying a bargaining-inspired approach to the problem of setting quantitative limits on greenhouse gas emissions within a numerical example that specifically includes the two largest emitters globally, China and the United States. Since this problem is in the end an exercise in controlling and restricting a quantity of output among producers, it is particularly amenable to an approach that draws upon oligopoly theory as a source, as the bargaining approach indeed does.
8 By accounting for the domestic calculus of the costs and benefits from cooperation, bargaining models can also focus our attention on a more sophisticated characterization of the strategic situations confronting states than can be achieved by a priori suppositions about the exogenous propensity of states to cooperate (or not) within the international system (Powell 1994: 337) . In the international relations literature, bargaining theory has been used especially to explain the breakdown of negotiations that lead to war. For example, James D. Fearon concluded that war among rational actors can arise as a result of failures either to communicate or to commit, and possibly also in the case that an object of desire is impossible to divide (Fearon 1995) . Robert Powell then showed that a commitment problem lies at the heart of all three scenarios and how this can arise from a rapid change in the distribution of power . The present article asserts that it is similarly crucial to understand the role of shifts in the distribution of natural and technological resources relating to energy use. In short, for the purposes of this analysis, energy is power. By highlighting the role of shifts in the balance of resource consumption, it is argued that complete-information bargaining analysis adds as much predictive and analytical power to the analysis of international environmental negotiations as it has done in the area of international security.
This article therefore considers how the balance of bargaining power among states can determine the scope for coordination in the issue area of carbon emissions from fossil fuel consumption and offers predictions concerning the necessary conditions for rising powers such as China to participate in a global climate change agreement. The next sub-section describes how a bargaining approach can be applied in combination with stylized models of the economic costs of atmospheric emissions, beginning with an introductory application to the case of ozone-depleting substances (ODS). Sections 2 and 3 then turn to the central case of climate change, before concluding with some final observations. 10 Most importantly, the results here suggest that to be feasible under current technological and economic conditions, any international agreement on climate change will have to allocate a level of future emissions for carbon dioxide in China that is at least twice as large as the level for the United States. If such a settlement is politically indigestible, then the model predicts that no agreement at all will be reached.
1.1 Bargaining in international relations theory: an initial application to stratospheric ozone depletion
International anarchy-that is, an international system composed of states pursuing their own self-interest under conditions of formal sovereign equality-creates its own challenges for coordinated action in response to problems of transboundary pollution (Young 1994) . The incentives to free ride on the efforts of others-and the difficulties involved in monitoring and enforcement-can be enormous; this is especially so when the timeframe and geographic scale of a pollution problem are large (Shum 2009 In a context of dynamic change, international anarchy also creates conditions where states find it impossible to make credible commitments. If, for example, a government knows that it will have greater bargaining power vis-à-vis another government in a future time period, it cannot credibly pledge in the present period that it will refrain from exploiting its improved power position in the future (Fearon 1995: 405) . A bargaining model can analyze such a situation, beginning with two states, A and B, who can choose between an agreement to implement a bargained outcome on the one hand, or else a refusal to coordinate on the other. Rubinstein provides the framework for analyzing a situation in which two actors are trying to divide the gains from cooperating by making a series of alternating offers, and Powell develops applications for an international relations context of explicitly analyzing the effects of a changing balance of power (Rubinstein 1982; Powell 1999: 118-133, 272-277) . 12 In the Rubinstein game, one actor begins by proposing a division of gains to the other who can either accept the offer or reject it and make a counteroffer, with both parties alternating offers until one party accepts the other's offer, and they both in effect agree on a division (Rubinstein 1982; Powell 1999: 87) . The key advantage of the modeling approach embodied in these models-from both Rubinstein (1982) and Powell (1996b Powell ( , 1999 -is to allow the players to make decisions about the size of the offers made during a negotiating process, so that the model can represent the riskreturn trade-off that a state faces in offering and agreeing to cooperate (Powell 1999: 86) . This feature can be complicated for multiple players, but clear predictions can be found in a two-player context. By allowing us to analyze the potential distribution of gains from an agreement, this framework can help us understand the effects of changing conditions. Specifically, we can apply this framework to international negotiations to address climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This will be the task in Sects. 2 and 3.
The rest of this section discusses the case of ozone-depleting substance (ODS) emissions and describes how cooperation easily emerges in this case, given the favorable payoff structure. Indeed, no formal model is needed at all to understand how the benefits of restricting ODS emissions far outweigh the costs. It is, however, worthwhile to introduce a complete-information cost-benefit analysis in this simplified setting.
First, let us therefore suppose that there is a status quo level of ODS production for a two-country world and that p represents country B's proportional share of the benefits from this production, while 1 -p represents country A's proportional share.
13 Thus, if p is close to one, B produces most of the world's ODS and has a controlling share of this market. If p is closer to zero, A is the larger producer instead.
Next, let b represent B's costs from the damages caused by its business-as-usual emissions, and let a similarly represent A's damage costs. B's business-as-usual payoff is therefore p -b, and A must offer concessions equivalent in value to in order to secure B's participation and willing compliance with a proposed agreement to limit emissions. 12 Powell provides additional solutions by backward programming for his games (Powell 1999: 274) . To arrive at these solutions, we begin by labeling a player as ''dissatisfied'' if it prefers an imposed settlement to what it would obtain in the bargaining game were the option of reaching a settlement not present; because it is costly to impose a settlement, at most only one bargainer can be dissatisfied. Most importantly, in equilibrium, the satisfied bargainer makes what is effectively an optimal take-it-or-leave-it offer, and the dissatisfied bargainer either accepts this offer or imposes a costly conflictual resolution (since in the event that a plausible counteroffer were available, the party would make it and by definition would no longer be dissatisfied). If both bargainers are satisfied, the options of imposing conflict have no effect, and the game is equivalent to one without outside options (Powell 1996b: 258ff.) . In the present setting, we can assume set roles for our players in accordance with the international relations application where one state is in relative decline and always satisfied with the status quo, while the other ''rising'' state is either satisfied or dissatisfied with the status quo distribution (relative to what it can obtain in the future-in other words, time is on the rising power's side), so that in either case counteroffers by this rising state are effectively off the equilibrium path. Then solving by backward programming, Powell establishes the result that the declining state prefers to a make an offer sufficient to appease the rising state throughout the shift in power if its initial stake in the status quo is at least as large as the costs of fighting, and if the total per-period cost of fighting is at least as large as the per-period change in the balance of power. For details and proofs, see Powell (1999: 272, 274-277) . 13 It should be stressed that p represents the benefits from production of relevant private goods-i.e., in the value of the actual CFCs used as refrigerants in the ODS case, or in the climate case, in the steel or aluminium produced in the course of burning fossil fuels, for example. Such benefits from production are not to be confused with the damages avoided by regulation and pollution control; the latter constitute benefits of abatement, which are obviously non-excludable public goods that are externalized and distributed globally irrespective of where production capacity is located. It is, of course, the tension between these differentially distributed costs and benefits that creates a collective action problem.
China, the United States, bargaining, and climate change 87
For example, in the most extreme case of disagreement, we can suppose that A prefers to eliminate all ODS production, and B prefers to continue to produce as usual. In that case, A has to compromise enough, so that B obtains concessions equivalent in value to the payoff it would get without cooperating and without having to reduce business-as-usual emissions.
In the ozone-depletion case, the balance of costs and benefits strongly favors tight restrictions on production and emissions. For example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated the net cost of continuing to produce its unilateral share of ODS production to be USD$21 billion for the value of unabated ODS production, minus USD$1,373 billion of damage costs from this additional production, mostly from excess skin cancer mortality (Barrett 2003: 228) . In other words, the United States estimated the costs of its own continued business-as-usual production to be sixtyfive times greater than the benefits. It is this relationship between costs and benefits in the ozone case that made cooperation inevitable. The above calculation was applied to the United States alone; the costs of worldwide production were correspondingly greater, for both the United States and the world. For other countries, even dramatically smaller estimates of costs and vulnerabilities to ozone depletion are unlikely to be outweighed by the limited benefits from production. Under such circumstances, b is greater than p, and p -b is negative, so that no offer is necessary to induce a country such as B to cooperate.
The ODS case therefore shows how, depending on the nature of the specific problem, cooperation can be a reflection of cost and benefit calculations. This case provides an illuminating contrast with the additional complexities of the climate change problem. Most importantly, in the climate case, we will see how a shifting balance in the use of resources relevant to an emissions problem can create a commitment problem that hinders cooperative outcomes.
Climate change as a commitment problem: a model
In the ozone case, the distribution of production resources remained relatively constant during and leading up to the period of negotiations for the Montreal Protocol. For example, the United States' share of world production in 1986 was the same as it had been 10 years earlier (Benedick 1998: 27) . Things are not so simple today, when climate negotiations are taking place at the same time as major shifts are occurring in the composition of the ranks of world's largest economies, especially in the case of the rapid economic growth of China.
The model presented in this section can capture this change, along with the longer time lags and smaller differentials between the costs and benefits of abatement, in order to explain why cooperation on this issue is so elusive. In addition, the next section will employ this model so as to offer concrete predictions of the kind of offer that is necessary to secure the cooperation of rapidly growing states. As before, we begin by analyzing the implications of a distributional shift over time in the parameter p, 14 which continues to be used here to represent a country's proportional share in the benefits to be derived from business-as-usual consumption of resources and the emissions that such consumption entails.
In the case of climate change, let us suppose that the likely distribution of the benefits from continued business-as-usual carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions is distributed between the two states as a proportion p [ [0, 1] . 15 Specifically, p now represents B's proportional share of carbon emissions, while 1 -p represents A's share. To make this stylization more concrete, further suppose that states A and B correspond to two distinct types of states, with A representing a slower-growing ''advanced'' (or ''satisfied'') economy, and B representing a country that is ''backward'' in the sense employed by Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) , where one can capitalize on underutilized resources and use established strategies and technologies in order to achieve faster growth. Thus, at the outset of the emissions case being analyzed, B's level of emissions is small compared to A's. However, projected growth rates for the two countries diverge, so that B's emissions will overtake those of A in the future, and p is increasing over time. Finally, let us assume that the shift in resource use is occurring due to exogenous drivers of uneven economic growth.
To capture this change over time and its effects on bargaining, we require additional parameters. Hence, for periods t = 1, 2,…, state A can attempt an agreement for both states to act jointly in departing from the business-as-usual emissions scenario and propose an agreement to limit emissions according to a proportional distribution x t . On seeing the proposed agreement x t , state B can either agree or not. If B accepts the proposal, it will receive x t in future periods, as specified in the agreement. If B rejects the offer, B is assumed to receive a probable allocation of business-as-usual energy resources p t , and A would receive 1 -p t .
16 Figure 1 presents the situation at time t graphically. In words, A and B are bargaining about the distribution of benefits and costs associated with the existing international energy system. A begins the game by either consuming energy and emitting greenhouse gases on a business-as-usual basis or else making a cooperative proposal x 0 [ [0, 1] , where the interval [0, 1] represents B's agreed share of benefits from world energy consumption. If A does not try to cooperate and chooses to proceed with business-as-usual, the game ends. If A makes a proposal, B can either accept it or else reject it and proceed on a business-as-usual basis. If B accepts the proposal, the distribution of benefits changes permanently to x 0 starting in the next period, and the game ends. If B rejects the proposal, the first round ends with the distribution of benefits remaining at the initial level of p 0 for the first round and increasing to p 1 for the next round. This sequence of moves is then repeated in the second and all subsequent rounds until the game ends. The game continues as long as A makes offers, and B rejects them. 15 However, since it is impossible to separate out and precisely measure the benefits derived from the CO 2 emitted during the process of consuming energy, we will assume that the proportion of benefits corresponds with the proportion of emissions. This is necessarily an approximation, and there is certainly reason to believe that the actual relationship is nonlinear, with the marginal benefit of added emissions diminishing at higher levels of income and energy consumption (see, e.g., Holtz-Eakin and Selden 1995; Schmalensee et al. 1998) ; nonetheless, it is beyond the scope of this article to estimate where this point will be reached, for example, in China. Therefore, for simplicity's sake, we will use projected levels of emissions as a proxy for the benefit derived from emissions. In this respect, we face difficulties that are similar to (and likely less acute than) those facing scholars of bargaining and war in operationalizing the distribution of benefits from a given geopolitical setting for the balance of power-i.e., to measure the spoils of war and peace, distinct from measures of power capabilities at a given moment in time. This difficulty is rarely discussed in the bargaining-and-war literature, but two notable exceptions are Werner (1999) and Reed et al. (2008) . 16 As presently described, the present game appears to be exclusively of a take-it-or-leave-it nature; a better interpretation of this game, however, is to consider it to be a specific application of Powell's (1999) infinitehorizon game (see Powell 1999: Chapter 4 and Appendix 4 for formal details), with the choices simplified so that the outside options of outright war and non-binding agreements are no longer relevant, and where state B, the ''backward'' or ''rising'' state, would be content with the indefinite continuation of a business-as-usual trajectory that allows B's energy use to grow indefinitely and for B to fully enjoy the benefits from that growth-i.e., that B's counteroffer at any stage of the game is in effect assumed always to be continuation of ''business-as-usual.'' See also note 11 supra.
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To specify the states' payoffs, we first have to suppose the states never agree: Thus, let p 0 , p 1 , p 2 ,… be the distribution of benefits in each period. 17 We note that beginning in the present day, at time t = 0, p 0 = p, and p is closer to zero than to one, since state A is producing more emissions than state B. For B, the total expected payoff in the absence of cooperation is p -b, where b denotes B's costs from the damages caused by B's businessas-usual emissions in excess of what these emissions would be under cooperation. Similarly, A's expected noncooperative payoff is 1 -p -a, where a is state A's additional business-as-usual damage costs.
Next, consider what happens if state B has a growing economy. A simple case could involve B having a probable business-as-usual share of world energy consumption that begins at p and increases to p 1 [ p in period one, then increases to p 2 [ p 1 in the next period, and further increases to p 3 [ p 2 in the period after that. For the purposes of the present analysis, let us assume that such a process of change in the rates and balance of economic growth between A and B continues over time until a certain stable point of convergence is reached far into the future. We can model this process of a shift in power that occurs over T periods. After the T-period shift, the distribution of bargaining power remains constant; more formally, assume that the distribution of power starts at p in the first round, rises by D in each of the next T periods, and then remains constant, so that p k = p ? kD for 0 B k B T and p k = p = p ? TD for k [ T. Thus, the overall change in the distribution of power is the difference p -p, and the rate at which this shift occurs is D = (p -p)/T. In terms of the overall payoff, if the states fail to reach an agreement in period t, and p does not change after t, expected payoffs from period t on are (1 -p t -a)/(1 -d) for state A and (p t -b)/(1 -d) for state B. From this baseline, we can now see what happens when changes in the distribution of power, p, occur over time.
We are specifically interested here in the substantive problem of how states cope with shifts in the distribution of resources between them during the shift in power (Powell 1999: 122) . For this reason, we focus on how the game changes during the power transition up to and until T. T represents, in other words, an upper bound in the shifting balance of power, over a finite course in the rise and fall of two specific powers that is perceptible to each. From time T forward, the solution of the game is intuitively straightforward and formally established by Powell (1999) : the satisfied state's optimal offer at T and in all future periods is to give the rising state just enough to ensure that it will prefer cooperation over conflict (that is, the business-as-usual state).
18 Working backward from time T, Powell (1999) also shows that the satisfied state prefers offering x t * over conflict at time t \ T if its initial stake in the distribution of benefits is at least b ? a and if the total per-period cost of conflict is at least as large as D.
19 Finally, Powell's (1999: 276-277) solution shows that throughout the period of the rise in B's power, and under conditions of complete information (as we are assuming in the present application), A will prefer offering x t * to the alternative of costly conflict. The crucial question, then, concerns the conditions under which B will prefer a negotiated agreement to the business-as-usual outcome.
A can avoid business-as-usual emissions in future periods by offering B enough to make the payoff to accepting the offer as large as the payoff to business-as-usual emissions. We define this condition by stating, in other words, that the rising state prefers accepting a proposal to business-as-usual emissions if the advanced state offers at least x t *.
20 To specify this condition, let us first suppose that A offers x t at time t. If B rejects this proposal and continues emitting at business-as-usual levels, its expected future payoff is
The first term in this sum is the rising state's per-period expected payoff to business-as-usual emissions in the next period, at time t ? 1; the second term is the discounted value of receiving this per-period payoff at time t ? 2; the third term represents the discounted per-period payoff at time t ? 3; and so on. This sum simplifies to (
is a positive number less than one, as it is for any reasonable scenario within our application. The expected business-as-usual payoff therefore incorporates D into the discounted value of future payoffs starting from p t?1 . In other words, the discounting of future payoffs for B is mitigated by the expected growth and change in bargaining power represented by D.
If, by contrast, B were to accept x t , its expected payoff would then be
The first term in this sum is the rising state's discounted expected per-period payoff to emitting according to the negotiated allocation in the next period, t ? 1, when the negotiated treaty first comes into effect. The second term is the rising state's discounted expected per-period payoff to cooperating at time t ? 2, and the third and subsequent terms are discounted values of future per-period payoffs to having agreed at time t when the distribution of power was p t . This sum and expected payoff can then be simplified to x t /(1 -d) since d is a positive number less than one. Country A can therefore secure cooperation by offering B enough to make the payoff from participating in an agreement covering future periods as large as the payoff from noncompliance and continuing business-as-usual emissions over the same periods of time. By comparing the two payoffs, we arrive at the condition that
This condition can be more conveniently represented in terms of the discount rate r, instead of the discount factor ,, so that we arrive at the following conclusion: B prefers to participate in a cooperative agreement as long as it receives an offer at least as large as x t * where x t * = (p t -b) 9 r / (r -D).
18 See Powell (1999: 274) and Appendix 3 for detailed proofs. Briefly, B's payoff to conflict at any t C T is (p -b)/(1 -d), so the satisfied state's optimal offer at all t C T is = U B -1 (p -b) , where the utility function U B is given by the stream of benefits from energy use extending into the future and is assumed to be increasing and concave. 19 See Powell (1999: 274-277 ) for formal proofs.
3 A shift in the balance of carbon: a numerical example In the present application, p is China's proportion of the total carbon dioxide emitted by both itself and the United States. Column 4 of Table 1 shows the extent of the shift in this proportion since 1990, when it was less than a third of the total, to the recently recorded level of 54 % in 2008; this growth is projected to continue through to a level of over 70 % in 2035.
In addition, the last column shows the annual rate of change in China's proportion of the two countries' emissions. The cell on the bottom right gives the estimate of D that will be used to calculate the minimum share of emissions necessary for an offer that can satisfy China: 0.48 %. In other words, China's proportion of emissions between 2015 (i.e., t 0 , or the potential year for the entry into effect of an agreement) and 2035 is projected to grow on the average by 0.48 % each year. This projected rate of growth, while substantial, is actually considerably smaller than the 0.87 % annual rate of proportional growth that was actually observed from 1990 to 2008.
Next, Table 2 shows estimated values for the other variables needed to calculate the minimum value of an offer to China.
Rows (3-4) and (6-7) of Table 2 relate to two different assumptions for the present discounted value of future payoffs. Discounting has generated a great deal of debate, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, two alternative rates of discount are provided: 1.4 and 4 %, corresponding to those employed in the widely known analyses of Stern (2007) and Nordhaus (1991b) , respectively. The implications of these two contrasting assumptions are displayed in Column 3 of Table 2 , where the cumulative effects of the discount rates in conjunction with D, the estimated change in the balance of carbon emissions, are listed.
The first two columns of Table 2 show estimates of the additional damage caused by business-as-usual growth in emissions above the projected first-period level in 2015 for the United States and China, respectively. The second row contains values for the variables a and b, or the average annual post-2015 damages from each country's respective emissions, stated as a share of total economic activity. These estimates are based on the methodology of Fankhauser and Kverndokk, and are provided for illustrative purposes rather than as a realistic accounting of the highly complex consequences likely to result from additional climate change.
21 Nevertheless, the intuition for these estimates can be readily understood. If, for example, the Stern Review (2007: 161ff.) estimates the cost of a [2°C rise in temperature from business-as-usual emissions to be at least 5 % of global GDP, it is reasonable to estimate that damages from the growth in emissions in a single year would be a fraction of the estimated 5 %, in as much as the total volume of emissions that was necessary to produce the 2°C rise has accumulated over more than a century, since the beginnings of economic industrialization.
The bottom three rows of Table 2 provide a robustness check for these estimates by presenting an alternative calculation of the benefits of abatement (in terms of damages avoided) based on higher values that are derived from the global estimates presented in Nordhaus (1991a: 146) . Finally, the final two columns of Table 2 present the values for x 2015 , the minimum emissions-sharing offer acceptable to China in 2015. Column 4 states this offer in terms of China's business-as-usual proportion of carbon emissions in 2015, while Column 5 states it in terms of the United States' proportion. The final figures presented in Column 5 show the remarkable result that the minimum offer acceptable to China is a present-day formula for the sharing of global emissions that amounts to an emissions quota that is at least twice as large as that for the United States.
Thus, as in the stratospheric ozone case, the likely damages from climate change are significant and accumulate globally, leading to a coordination problem of the first order. The climate change problem, however, differs from the ozone case and is most importantly exacerbated by a critical feature: the uneven distribution of the costs of abatement. In terms of one particular component of these costs-that is, the opportunity costs of forgone energy-intensive growth-the burden for these costs falls hardest on precisely those states whose emissions are growing fastest; hence, these states are also the least inclined to agree to binding limits or reductions in emissions, despite the absolute necessity for securing their participation in order to achieve an effective agreement. The result is, in other words, an extremely high degree of bargaining power that is vested in a growing, rising power.
This result has two further implications deserving further discussion. First, it once again demonstrates the importance of discounting assumptions, but does so in a new light. 22 The existing literature on the economics of climate change focuses on the implications of a lower discount rate in terms of a higher valuation of future damages, thereby increasing the urgency of the need to make immediate global policy changes. 23 The analysis here, however, shows the potentially drastic effects of a lower discount rate on the distribution of the policy burden on climate change through the resulting change in valuation of future abatement costs across countries. In effect, our analysis shows a different aspect of how a Although the setting is different, the underlying dynamic here is similar to that in Fearon (1998: 294, 296) , and its finding that ''costly standoffs are more likely to occur in cases where state leaderships discount future payoffs relatively little''. 23 See, e.g., Stern (2007) , and the analysis of climate-model discount rate choices in Dasgupta (2008) . The peculiar relevance of discounting for climate policy is summarized concisely by Weitzman (2009: 1) when he notes that part of the ''economic uniqueness of the climate change problem'' is the fact that ''today's decisions have difficult-to-reverse impacts that will be felt very far out into the future, thereby straining the concept of time discounting and placing a heavy burden on the choice of an interest rate''. That is, the previous column divided by (1 -P China, 2015 ) c That is, a restatement of national damages as percentages of total China-USA GDP, proportional to national share of total CO 2 emissions d That is, average of damage estimates for each period (as in row 1), multiplied by respective values for P USA in Table 1 e That is, average of damage estimates for each period (as in row 1), multiplied by respective values for P China in Table 1 f William D. Nordhaus estimates the annualized value of global damages avoided by an 11 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions to be $6 billion, within a $20 trillion global economy; see Nordhaus (1991a: 148-149) . The values here distribute this global 0.03 % estimate according to the average ratio of 1:2 among future emissions summarized as P in Table 1 (without further discounting these shares by the contribution to emissions from the rest of the world) lower discount rate values the welfare of future generations more highly: It not only values future damages more highly, but also places a premium on the increases in welfare that would be forgone in rapidly growing regions in the event of severe and uniform restrictions on carbon emissions. Second, this analysis provides a framework for understanding a critical challenge for any cooperative burden-sharing agreement on climate change. While the opportunities for mutual gain from a coordinated response exist, they are also constrained by the incentives to gain from the increased use of energy within a growing economy. A realistic approach to climate policy must therefore address the true costs and benefits of proposed policy options for all countries, including those that constitute rapidly growing emerging markets, in addition to those of mature and demographically contracting advanced economies whose levels of nonrenewable energy use are in any event likely to stabilize or even diminish. Recognition of the crucial role of change in the balance of resource use and carbon emissions is in this way a necessary element of policy analysis-an element particularly highlighted by the use of dynamic models.
The primary limitation of this analysis lies in its use of projected estimates for future energy use and emissions. Actual patterns of energy demand and consumption will clearly vary a great deal from even the most careful projections. In the past, some analysts have argued that the International Energy Agency's models and projections understate the tendency for energy use and emissions to level off and decline in higher-income economies (Schmalensee et al. 1998) , while other observers insist that the potential exists for rapid gains from technological innovation to achieve substantial emissions reductions at a lower cost than currently expected (Porter 1991; Esty and Andrew 2009) . Regulation can in some cases encourage innovation that shifts static calculations of costs and benefits in a favorable direction (Porter and van der Linde 1995) ; on the other hand, it is also important to recognize the costs and inefficiencies that could result from premature deployment of technologies that are unsuitable, or merely underdeveloped and therefore better positioned to reap cost savings accruing from more gradual accumulation of experience in installation and transmission. 24 In any event, the analysis here shows that the impact of China's recent economic growth is on such a scale that even a drastic shortfall in projections for growth or energy use is unlikely to change the trajectory of a global energy shift that is not only ongoing, but also heavy with consequence for the dynamics of international climate change negotiations.
Despite these reservations, promising areas for further research exist. One would be to adjust the settings for the relative bargaining power of the two parties, including different and more realistic possibilities for counteroffers to be made, or outside options to be taken. 25 Another would be to analyze the implications of negotiations that involve multiple actors. Finally, another possible extension would venture further into the future, so as to factor in costs and benefits of abatement that are more distant in time. Such an analysis could incorporate additional scenarios such as the design of international agreements to last more than 20 years and reveal more about prospective negotiating dynamics over the longer duration.
Conclusion and theoretic implications
This article has shown how recent changes in the emissions paths of the world's two largest carbon dioxide emitters, the United States and China, affect the bargaining dynamics of international climate negotiations. The analysis draws attention to the counterintuitive role played by parameters such as the discount rate: although a lower discount rate is conventionally held to strengthen the aggregate global case for aggressive abatement in the near term, this is not true for the specific case of an individual state that is enjoying rapid economic growth while on an accelerating emissions path. This finding, in turn, highlights the sensitivity of policy conclusions to parameters such as discount rates and future expectations of growth and technological innovation, all of which must be assumed in the present, but are nevertheless subject to great uncertainty for the future. By using conservative estimates and assumptions found elsewhere in the literature, the numerical example in this study arrives at a pessimistic conclusion about the ''bottom line'' of an international climate change agreement: limits on carbon emissions negotiated on a country-by-country basis must allocate a limit for China that is twice as large as a limit for the United States in order for a bargained outcome to be feasible. Such a result is unlikely to be politically palatable in the immediate future. Even so, this relative amount is still considerably lower than the proportion that would be allocated to China under a strictly per capita-based formula. Viewed in this way, the two-to-one China-to-US ratio is plausibly a negotiating focal point that will provide a way out of the impasse between arguments in favor of per capita-based formulas and those based on past consumption.
In terms of theory and methodology, this study applied a bargaining model to climate change negotiations, one that was adapted from approaches that are prominent in the recent international relations literature. A key advantage of the bargaining approach to international relations is found in the parsimonious manner in which it incorporates domestic considerations and their consequences on international strategy, by modeling them as the internalized costs that a society incurs from undertaking a given course of action. In this respect, the bargaining approach recognizes two components that are crucial for understanding global environmental politics in general and efforts to regulate climate change specifically: the distribution of conflicting interests, and uncertainty about future developments. 26 Whenever such factors are overlooked, or even merely underspecified, it becomes impossible to explain when or why a change in global governance practices occurs (as in the ozone-depletion case), or does not occur (as in the climate change case). As this article has demonstrated, bargaining theory provides a useful means for filling this gap in our understanding of outcomes in global environmental governance.
Bargaining theory has consequently provided a tool for confronting the central question of how to ''divide the pie'' of global greenhouse gas emissions among the countries of the world in a politically feasible manner-either with or without the customary a priori assumption that the prospect of future damages will necessitate policies to shrink the pie at any cost. At present, despite decades of international conferences and declarations, there is consensus on neither the principles that are necessary to organize an agreement on global climate change, nor the specific formulae that states could reasonably accept for the use of allocating binding numerical limits on emissions. It has been observed that given this lack of agreement on substantive obligations, much recent negotiating activity has instead concerned itself with the scope of provisions for flexibility in implementation (Von Stein 2008; Biermann et al. 2009; Thompson 2010 )-a trend observed not only in the present-day climate change ''regime complex'' specifically (Keohane and Victor 2011) , but also in other international and multilateral environmental agreements generally. 27 In this article, we have directly addressed how the substantive content of cooperation in the issue area of carbon emissions is constrained by the balance of bargaining power that has accrued to states as a reflection of their relative economic strength and overall share of world fossil fuel consumption.
While bargaining theory has in the past been used most extensively in the international relations literature to explain why states engage in costly wars instead of reaching negotiated agreements that avoid such costs, there is in fact no reason for this approach to be limited to cases of violent interstate conflict. 28 This article has extended the bargaining approach to the case of global environmental politics. As a final observation, we note that it is curious that additional applications of this kind have not been carried out in the field of international relations generally, given that fruitful applications of related dynamic complete-information game-theoretic approaches have been made outside of political science in areas far removed from war and the use of force, 29 in areas such as evolutionary biology (Maynard Smith 1982) , labor markets (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Fernandez and Glazer 1991) , and macroeconomic policy reform (Barro and Gordon 1983; Bulow and Rogoff 1989; Alesina and Drazen 1991; Chang 1995; Barta 2009 ). Relevant insights are promised by the use of such an approach to analyze global policy problems such as climate change.
